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Abstract
The multiple applications matching function derived in Albrecht, Gautier,
Tan and Vroman (2004) involves terms which are very “convoluted”. This letter
proposes an alternative more concise function, derived using applicant types as
the source of randomness rather than the resulting application outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Original matching functions were derived in an urn-ball set-up, with workers making
single applications and firms oﬀering single vacancies. A typical example is Blanchard
and Diamond (1990). More recent works have introduced multiplicity to this frame-
work. For example Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) investigate matching outcomes
∗Tel.: +44-20-7631-6424; fax: +44-20-7631-6416.
E-mail address: k.hori@bbk.ac.uk.
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when firms oﬀer varying numbers of vacancies. Albrecht, Gautier, Tan and Vroman
(2004) on the other hand allow multiple applications by workers. Then with v va-
cancies and u applicants, each making a ≥ 1 applications, the number of matches is
given by,
M(u, v; a) = u(1−Ψ) (1)
where Ψ is the probability that an applicant receives no job oﬀer from any of the a
firms that he applies to,
Ψ =
uX
i=1
uX
j=1
...
uX
l=1
µ
1− 1
i
¶µ
1− 1
j
¶
...
µ
1− 1
l
¶
∆1(i)∆2(i, j)...∆a(i, j, ..., l) (2)
∆m(i, j, ..., k) is the conditional probability that there are k applicants at the mth
vacancy to which the worker applies to, given i, j, ... applicants at vacancies 1, ...,m−
1.1 The expressions for these conditional probabilities, given in Tan (2003), rapidly
become very “convoluted” (Tan, 2003) for later vacancies. For example for m = 2,
∆2(i, j) =
X
z
µ
i− 1
z
¶µ
u− i
j − 1− z
¶
×
µ
a− 1
v − 1
¶z µ
1− a− 1
v − 1
¶i−1−z µ a
v − 1
¶j−1−z µ
1− a
v − 1
¶u−i−(j−1−z)
In this letter I propose an alternative derivation for Ψ which yields a much more
concise expression of the multiple-application matching function. This is done in
1Albrecht et al. (2003a) originally derived the multiple-applications matching function assuming
independence between the probabilities of the number of applicants at each vacancy, a mistake which
was pointed out by Tan (2003) and was later corrected by Albrecht et al. (2003b).
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Section 2 by modelling applicant types as the source of randomness rather than the
resulting application outcomes at vacancies. Section 3 checks the limiting case as
u, v → θ and vu → θ <∞. The letter concludes with a remark in Section 4.
2 The Matching Function
First I introduce a type matrix T , the column vectors of which indicate the vacancies
applied by diﬀerent types of applicants. For example if v = 3 and a = 2,
T =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(3)
For example here type 1 workers apply to vacancies 1 and 2. The number of types is
given by τ =
¡v
a
¢
, which in this case is
¡
3
2
¢
= 3. T is thus a v × τ matrix. Applicants
are otherwise assumed homogeneous.
Next denote by vector n = (n1, n2, ..., nτ )0 the realized number of each type.
The restriction is that
Pτ
t=1 nt = u. The number of applications at each vacancy
α(n) = (α1(n), α2(n), ..., αv(n))0 is then, where
Pv
j=1 αj(n) = au,
α(n) = Tn (4)
Given realizations of n, a worker can then calculate the number of his competi-
tors at each of the vacancies that he applies to. Assume without loss of generality
that the representative applicant is of type 1. Then the constraint for the real-
3
ization n is that n1 ≥ 1. Denote the set of all possible such realizations by Ω,
i.e. Ω ≡ {n |n1 ≥ 1;
Pτ
t=1 nt = u}. There are
¡τ+u−2
u−1
¢
elements in Ω.2 Given that
workers choose their type randomly, the probability that n takes particular values
(n1, n2, ..., nτ )0 ∈ Ω is the ratio of the number of distinct ways that this set of values
can be attained, and the total number of distinct ways that u − 1 workers can be
assigned to τ types,
p (n) =
(u− 1)!
(n1 − 1)!
Qτ
t=2 nt!
1
τu−1
(5)
Now assuming that firms randomly select one candidate when they receive more
than one applications, the probability of an applicant receiving zero job oﬀer ex-post
of the realizations of n is the product of the probabilities 1 − 1αj(n) that he receives
no job oﬀer from each of the vacancies he applies to, which for the type 1 applicant
is the first a vacancies. Taking the expectation of this over all possible values of n
therefore yields the ex-ante probability of zero job oﬀer from any of the a jobs,
Ψ =
X
n∈Ω
p(n)
aY
j=1
µ
1− 1
αj(n)
¶
(6)
The number of matches m is then given by (1).
As an example consider the case u = 3, v = 3 and a = 2. The type ma-
trix was given in (3). Assuming again that the representative applicant is of type
1, there are
¡3+3−2
2
¢
= 6 possible realizations of the types of the 3 applicants,
2This can be proved by induction.
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Ω ≡ {(3, 0, 0)0 , (2, 1, 0)0 , (2, 0, 1)0 , (1, 2, 0)0 , (1, 0, 2)0 , (1, 1, 1)0}. For each of these real-
izations the probability and the application outcome are, using (5) and (4), p(n) ∈©
1
9 ,
2
9 ,
2
9 ,
1
9 ,
1
9 ,
2
9
ª
andα(n) ∈ {(3, 3, 0)0 , (3, 2, 1)0 , (2, 3, 1)0 , (3, 1, 2)0 , (1, 3, 2)0 , (2, 2, 2)0}
respectively. Then (6) gives the probability of no job oﬀer as
Ψ =
1
9
.
4
9
+
2
9
.
1
3
+
2
9
.
1
3
+
1
9
.0 +
1
9
.0 +
2
9
.
1
4
=
41
162
which is the same result as attained by Tan (2003).
3 The Limiting Case
Investigate now the limiting case of (6) as u, v →∞ and vu → θ <∞. It is intuitive
that then the covariances of the numbers of applicants at each vacancy go to zero. To
show it, rewrite the type matrix T as, for a ≥ 2,
T =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 · · · 1
1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
←−−−−−−−−→
τ11
1 · · · 1
0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
←−−−−−−→
τ12←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
τ1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
0 · · · 0
1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
←−−−−−−−→
τ21
0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
←−−−−−−−−→
τ22←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
τ2
(7)
where the number of columns of each block are,
τ1 =
µ
v − 1
a− 1
¶
, τ2 =
µ
v − 1
a
¶
(8)
τ11 =
µ
v − 2
a− 2
¶
, τ12 = τ21 =
µ
v − 2
a− 1
¶
, τ22 =
µ
v − 2
a
¶
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Then for example α1(n) and α2(n) are, using (4),
α1(n) =
τ11X
t=1
nt +
τ11+τ12X
t=τ11+1
nt
α2(n) =
τ11X
t=1
nt +
τ1+τ21X
t=τ1+1
nt
Two things happen in the limit: as u→∞, nt’s become independent, and as v →∞,
the second terms dominate, as τ12τ11 =
v−a
a−1 → ∞. Hence cov [α1(n), α2(n)] goes to
zero. By symmetry this is true for all {αi(n), αj(n)}, i 6= j. Therefore
lim
u,v→∞
X
n∈Ω
p(n)
aY
j=1
µ
1− 1
αj(n)
¶
=
(X
n∈Ω
p(n)
µ
1− 1
α1(n)
¶)a
(9)
Next evaluate the following term, where Ωα1 ≡ {n |n1 ≥ 1;
Pτ1
t=1 nt = α1 } for given
α1,
X
n∈Ω
p(n)
1
α1(n)
=
uX
α1=1
⎛
⎝ X
n∈Ωα1
p(n)
⎞
⎠ 1
α1
=
uX
α1=1
(¡ u−1
α1−1
¢
τα1−11 τ
u−α1
2
τu−1
)
1
α1
=
uX
α1=1
aα1−1
α1!
⎛
⎝
α1−1Y
j=1
u− j
v − a
⎞
⎠
µ
v − a
v
¶u−1
In the limit then,
lim
u,v→∞
v/u→θ
X
n∈Ω
p(n)
1
α1(n)
=
∞X
α1=1
1
α1!
³a
θ
´α1−1
e−
a
θ =
θ
a
³
1− e−aθ
´
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Applying this to (9) yields the same limiting result as that derived by Albrecht,
Gautier and Vroman (2003a),
lim
u,v→∞
v/u→θ
Ψ =
½
1− θ
a
³
1− e−aθ
´¾a
(10)
4 Remark
One major advantage of working with the applicant types, rather than the resulting
application outcomes, is that the framework can easily incorporate workers’ optimiz-
ing behaviors. This leads naturally to a model of directed search, where workers
choose their application patterns by taking into consideration factors such as wage
levels and skills match. A potential extension would then be a model of wage disper-
sion, with the equilibrium wage levels determined endogenously.3
3Many assume workers’ non-observance of wage levels prior to application to explain wage disper-
sion (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). Moen (1997) introduces submarkets within which matching
takes place to explain wage dispersion even when applicants observe wage levels. However in his paper
the wage levels are assigned exogenously. Galenianos and Kircher (2005) analyze the direct search
process as a portfolio choice problem, and show that workers’ willingness to send applications to
separate wage levels incentivize firms to post diﬀerent wages.
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